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1970 might well be described as a European year. To be sure, most if 
not all the major crises of the year occurred outside Europe, in the narrow 
sense of the term. But there can be few other parts of the world where con-
structive developments took place with comparable momentum. Not surprising-
ly, some were pleased, others alarmed, or at least concerned about these de-
velopments. In some countries, there is today a sensitivity about European 
developments which feeds the obvious interests in keeping Europeans apart. 
Insofar as these sensitivies are founded in false or lacking information 
about us, and notably about the European Community, it is our task to supply 
and correct such information; insofar as they are founded on the fear of 
the emerging power of European countries cooperating in more and more fields, 
they are simply an indication of a new fact in world politics. 
The conference of heads of government and chiefs of state in The Hague 
on December 1st and 2nd, 1969, will probably go down in the annals of the 
European Community as one of the three or four crucial events of motive 
force. Due largely to the convincing decisiveness of Chancellor BRANDT and 
the open-minded farsightedness of President ·POMPIDOU, this conference laid 
down in 16 points the future path of Europe and thereby helped overcome a 
period of doubts and depressions. 
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Since The Hague, at least three significant developments have taken place. 
On January 1st, 1970, the transitional phase of the Community of Six came to 
an end. As a matter of fact, this happened a few weeks later; but part of the. 
"acquis communautaire," of the acquired habits of the Communities, is the cu-
rious custom of arresting the clock, until some time in February, March, or 
April, one can at last begin the new year officially. The last stumbling 
block -- significantly the market regulation for wine, and one that will find 
favor only with a few Moselle wine-growers in particularly arid parts -- was 
removed on April 21st. Since then, the Community has entered its definite 
phase. Among other things, this means that the Commission is now in charge 
of important sectors of common action, notably in the field of commercial 
policy. Beyond the representation of the Six in a number of international 
organizations, the treaty-making power for commercial agreements now rests 
with the body of which I have the honor to be a member, and which is so hard 
to describe in the terms of traditional constitutional theory. Apart from the 
conclusion of a number of agreements in the Mediterranean area, our initia-
tive for the introduction of generalized preferences in favor of developing 
countries (notably in Latin American and Asia), and the beginning of our 
negotiations with Japan, are indications of the activities of the Community 
in its new phase. 
A second, equally important, if more spectacular development during 
this year concerns the opening of negotiations with Britain, Ireland, Den-
mark, and Norway about full entry into the Community. I need not relate the 
long and somewhat unhappy story of the enlargement of the Community here. 
Suffice it to say that even in the early stages of the negotiations there 
can be little doubt that this time everybody around the table means business, 
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that particularly in the case of Britain another failure to come to an agree-
ment would have grave consequences for Europe and beyond, and that there is 
little sense in spending an undue amount of time for the negotiations them-
selves, even if we shall have to allow for a considerable transitional period 
once the negotiations have been concluded. This conclusion of the negotiations 
may well happen before July, 1972. The growing concern of third countries, 
and their wish to be kept informed is perhaps an index of our progress. We 
shall certainly make sure that everybody who is materially affected by the 
enlargement of the European Community is at least heard and that his case is 
considered. At the same time, we have to insist on our policy to create an 
enlarged European Community with all the obvious and the hopeful consequences 
which this process has for those who have grown accustomed to seeing Europe 
divided. We trust that in balance these consequences will be favorable even 
for those who still fear them. 
A third development set in motion in The Hague is rather less spectacular, 
but possibly the most important of all. Before the end of this year, the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the Six, on the advice of an ad hoe committee headed by the 
Luxembourg Prime Minister WERNER, will probably decide to embark on the first 
of three stages towards an economic and currency union of the Community. The 
first stage is the easiest to take. The methods of consultation and cautious 
measures of monetary policy foreseen in it are all within the confines deter-
mined by the Treaty of Rome. But it is very unlikely that the first stage 
will be the last. Its intrinsic momentum, the will of the member states as 
expressed in point eight of the Hague communiqu~, and possibly even its inter-
est for those countries which have applied for membership in the Community, 
all have made the economic and monetary union an almost inevitable next step 
in the development of the European Community. The implications of this step 
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are considerable. They range from the immediate problems of flexibility --
or, in this case, inflexibility -- of exchange rates, through questions in-
volving the relation between European currencies and the dollar, to the poli-
' 
tical and institutional implications of the attempt to design a common econo-
mic policy for the member countries of the Community. 
Perhaps this last statement merits one further comment. I have not men-
tioned so far the much-quoted Point 15 of the communiqu€! of The Hague. Here 
the member states committed themselves to promoting progress in the field of 
political union. In order to prepare a first substantive proposal, a special 
committee headed by Mr. DAVIGNON political director of the Belgian Foreign 
Ministry, was set up; the committee has recently presented a preliminary re-
port. This "Davignon report" has met with more criticism than applause, and 
indeed its proposals for what are essentially inter-governmental and not 
Community contacts in the fields not yet covered by the treaties are modest. 
But perhaps the insufficiencies of this proposal are less unfortunate than 
the romanticism of some of their critics. For there were, and are indeed 
some romantic Europeans who continue to invoke political union, and in their 
fascination with an imagined final state, overlook the realities which have 
already developed as well as those which may be developed starting here and 
now. It is fortunate, therefore, that more realistic Europeans are increasing-
ly taking the lead in Brussels as well as in the member states. Political 
union and the present work of the Community and its Connnission are not two 
different things; it makes no sense to try and add some imaginary political 
union to what we are doing today. Rather, the political unification of Europe 
is a process, and one which will probably forever be as unfinished as that of 
any federal political connnunity. 
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We have already gone through a few important stages on this road; 
further stages will be reached in the next few years. The process of poli-
I 
tical unity is one of continuously adding more substance to Community action. 
This may be in the fields of commercial policy, the planning of research, 
market regulations for wine, and adaptation of social legislation, exchange 
rates, an economic policy of stability, or in the traditional realms of 
"grosse Politik," that is, foreign and defense policy. So long as the Com-
munity is gaining in substance for common decision-making, it is growing in 
political strength. Davignon report or not, Europe is taking long strides 
in this dire.ction at the moment, and the fact that the road ahead of us is 
still long, is a challenge and not a cause for despair. 
It would be tempting at this point to insert a few remarks about the 
institutional side of Europe's growth and activity. I would then have to 
give you a partly amusing, partly just confusing picture of a set-up which 
the authors of the Federalist Papers not only did not foresee, but of which 
they would certainly not have approved either. However, there is merely one 
remark which I want to make in this context because it is directly connected 
with Europe's role in world politics today. 
The European Community is gaining in substance and scope at a time at 
which its member states, as well as many other countries in East and West, 
are trying to find ways to promote d~tente by exploring areas of corrnnon in-
terest between formerly conflicting parties. When I began by describing 1970 
as the year of Europe, some of you may have thought that I was referring to 
the German-Soviet treaty and to President Pompidou's visit to Moscow, or 
to the slowly crystallizing notion of a European Security Conference. I was 
not, because these developments are still at an early stage, and it is diffi-
cult, indeed, to tell what their outcome is going to be. But they are develop-
ments which affect the European Community in more ways than one. 
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There are no direct relations between the European Community and the 
communist countries of Eastern Europe (with the exception of Yugoslavia which 
has a commercial agreement with the Community and an ambassador to the Com-
munity in Brussels). The Commission represents, however, the Six in a number 
of international organizations in which East European countries are also mem-
bers, such as GA.TT or UNCTAD. Our treaty-making power is still waived with 
respect to East European countries until January 1, 1973; by that time, it 
will come into full force. Even today, member states are bound to consult 
with the Community concerning bilateral agreements and to abide by certain 
rules in the·ir conclusion. Thus, the hesitation of the Soviet Union, and 
consequently of the smaller countries of Eastern Europe to establish formal 
relations with the Community, or to "recognize" it internationally can be 
no more than a matter of time. 
Members of the Ministerial Council of the Community clearly welcome all 
activities of member states contributing to building bridges where there were 
none in the past. The Commission has stated through its President, Mr. MALFATTI, 
that it welcomes developments such as SALT, renunciation of force agreements, 
mutually balanced force reduction, and a European Security Conference. The 
European Community is not a product of the cold war nor does it have a~y 
stake in reviving it. 
We are a community of free and democratic countries, but as such we are 
bound to be both outward-looking and prepared to contribute to peaceful re-
lations between peoples wherever possible. Thus we regard the countries of 
Eastern Europe as partners, even if they do not,or cannot, want to be.members. 
But this word "partnership" is meant in a specific way which is why I 
mention it in the context of institutional strucutres. Our partners are the 
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East European countries. We do not feel that the same can be said for the 
organization of Comecon. There may be questions which can usefully be dis-
cussed within the ,framework of an organization like Comecon. But contrary 
to this organization, the Conunission of the European Conununity is emphatical-
ly not the secretariat of an international organization. Moreover, whatever 
difficulties the decision-making process in the Council of the European Com-
munity may involve -- and they are considerable -- they show that we are not 
dominated by one superpower. The European Conununity is a creation sui generis 
not merely in constitutional terms, but also with respect to its position in 
world politics. It is more than, less than, the sum of and something differ-
ent from its member states. Confusing as such a description may sound, it is 
nevertheless fair to expect that this new reality be recognized by all those 
who favor a realistic approach as the safest guide to world peace. 
In its policy towards the East, the European Conununity is taking part 
in developments, but not leading them as such. There are, however, certain 
aspects of world politics where the European Community by its own initiative 
has contributed to peace and prosperity. I want to mention two of these be-
cause they are important, and controversial at the same time. 
Apart from South East Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean is the second 
seat of violent conflict in the world today. Now that the superpowers have 
moved in, both an escalation and an immediate solution of this conflict be-
come possible. But inunediate solutions are not enough. With few exceptions, 
the economic, social and political conditions in the countries of the Eastern 
Mediterranean shores, are unstable. In order to find long-term solutions, 
armistice may be one prerequisite, but the instruments are surely of a dif-
ferent kind. Whoever wants lasting peace in the Mediterranean must assist 
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the countries of the area in their economic and social development, while 
respecting their right to decide about their political future themselves. 
This is how the European Community understands its obligation in this area. 
The traditional relations between Europe and the Mediterranean countries 
have been close and manifold. Our agreements with these countries reflect this 
fact. Apart from France and Italy, members of the Community, there are other 
countries which feel that they belong to Europe, and which aim, therefore, at 
full membership in the Community. Our association agreement with Greece has 
been partly suspended last year,; but I sincerely hope that we shall soon 
see conditions in Greece which permit the continuation of the process of asso-
ciation. With Turkey, we have just concluded the second agreement about asso-
ciation involving on the part of Turkey the courageous decision to enter the 
transitional phase in which obligations become increasingly mutual. Our re-
lations with Spain, Israel, Yugoslavia, Malta, and Cyprus are looser and, 
incidentally, different in each case -- but in all cases the agreements we 
have or intend to conclude foresee increasingly close cooperation. 
The Maghreb countries were traditionally tied to France. The Community 
has taken over this responsibility of one of its members; we shall see to it 
that these countries will not lose the advantages they had in the past, and 
will add new ones if possible. Recently, we have begun negotiations about 
preferential trade agreements with the United Arab Republic and Lebanon. It 
was the will of the Council that there should be a parallelism between our 
treatment of Israel and that of the Arab countries. Negotiations are going 
well, and I anticipate their early conclusion. 
I have just mentioned the word -- "preferential trade agreements" --
which has given rise to some international debates about our Mediterranean 
-------------- ---------------------------
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policy. The attempt to carry this debate into GATT, and to censure our agree-
ments there, has failed once again this year. Still, the opposition runs deeper, 
I 
and requires a clear statement. The agreements we have with many countries 
around the Mediterranean basin are an attempt to discharge what we regard as 
our responsibility for this area. We do not want to harm anybody in doing so, 
but we insist that it is a European obligation to promote long-term stability 
in that part of the world. Moreoever, it corresponds to historical relations 
if we offer many of the countries concerned the prospect of full association 
with the Community. The only criticism of our policy which I can regard as 
legitimate is that there is a certain inadequacy as between our political 
goals and the economic instruments we are using. Certainly, preferential 
tariff reductions of 50 percent for lemons are not sufficient to promote 
social and economic stability in a developing country. Here, power and 
weakness of the European Community as it stands today become evident. 
But I trust that the Community will have the strength to overcome this 
inadequacy by adding new instruments rather than by changing old goals. Our 
preferential trade agreements are -- if I leave aside the particular relations 
to developing countries for a moment limited to the Mediterranean area; 
our political responsibilities are not. In July, 1970, twenty Latin Ameri-
can countries have agreed on the "Declaration of Buenos Aires," asking the 
European Community to work out with Latin America a policy for closer coopera-
tion. The Community will respond to this invitation in a constructive way 
before the end of this year. In addition, we are already engaged in nego-
tications about a commercial agreement with Argentina. But whatever form 
the cooperation will take, whether it is commercial or political, it is clear-
ly motivated by different intentions than our Mediterranean policy. This means 
inter alia that we do not intend to translate our Mediterranean policy to 
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Latin America. For Latin America, another type of policy including another 
set of instruments of cooperation will have to be developed in order to 
\ 
satisfy the specific needs of this continent and its cooperation with 
Europe. 
One such instrument has been the subject of multilateral discussions 
in the last weeks, and has finally been accepted by the council of UNCTAD 
this week: the proposal to grant generalized preferences to developing 
countries which was first launched by the European Community. Perhaps no 
other single measure demonstrates with equal clarity the ways in which the 
European Community wants to discharge its responsibilities in the world. 
The offer to all developing countries of non-discriminatory preferences 
for all industrial goods is intended to further the growth of industry in 
the less-developed parts of the world. The Community, and unfortunately 
nobody but the Community, has shown that it means this seriously by includ-
ing textiles in its offer despite protests by the domestic textile industry. 
We felt and feel that, considering the special role which the textile in-
dustry continues to play almost everywhere in the development of industria-
lization, there was little justification in excluding this branch. 
Growing industries elsewhere mean growing competition. We want this 
competition because we believe that it is in the interests of the welfare 
of more and more people. But perhaps the decisive advantage of the genera-
lized preference scheme is that it is designed to achieve a specific purpose 
by means which lead to further liberalization rather than new restrictions 
in world trade. None of the great trading partners can justly claim to have 
followed the principles of GATT at all times and in all places. I am far 
from pretending that the European Community is beyond criticism in this re-
spect. But I would maintain that whenever we are faced with a problem or a 
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purpose, our first option is for measures which extend free trade and there-
by liberty in the world. We uphold this option even against resistance at 
home and abroad, and indeed, even if some of our major partners do not fol-
1 
low us. Thus it is probable that we shall put into force our offer of genera~ 
lized preferences before we know whether the Congress of the United States 
will accept the rather more conditional American scheme, in the hope that it 
will prove better to go forward too quickly than to look backward too often. 
Even without my mentioning it directly, it is obvious that the question 
of Europe's role in world politics involves our relations with the United 
States at many points. Now it is not my intention, on the eve of important 
talks with the U.S. government, to make public statements which might be re-
garded as indiscreet by my hosts. I shall, therefore, confine myself to a 
few general remarks which are nevertheless indicative of our ideas and in-
tentions. 
For many years, the United States has encouraged all developments lead-
ing to greater cooperation between European countries. Indeed, there were 
times when America appeared to some to be more European-minded than the 
Europeans themselves. Today, this attitude is no longer so clearly in evi-
dence. In the words of Under Secretary Samuels, the United States is no 
longer prepared to trade short-term economic disadvantages for long-term 
political goals. I cannot see where such economic disadvantages are looming;../ 
but then the real point of such statements may be a growing doubt about the 
long-term goals of European cooperation, coordination, and possibly one day 
unity. Instead of mutual encouragement, we now find a new style of scepti-
cism gaining ground in European-American relations. Recriminations about 
agricultural policy, about preferential agreements, about special and inverse 
i 
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preferences are expressed in bilateral talks as well as in international 
organizations, and they are used as an excuse for measures inside the United 
States which in their impact are of a different order of magnitude altogether. I 
The path taken by the European Community in the last few years may not have 
been altogether predictable, but it was consistent and straight. By con-
trast, we feel that developments in the United States have led to certain 
changes which we do not and cannot follow with much enthusiasm. Such lack 
of enthusiasm is due not only to the fact that some of these developments 
such as the much-discussed Trade Bill -- involve considerable and I think un-
precedented injury to legitimate interests in the European Community and else-
where; it is also due to the underlying philosophy of the new approaches taken 
by the United States. At a point like this, and in the context of a confer-
ence which is North Atlantic in scope, it may be useful to remind all of us 
of a few principles by which we should be guided in order to avoid any deter-
ioration in our mutual relations. 
First, it is important to remember that the European Community and the 
United States subscribe to a similar set of assumptions about the way to or-
ganize our social life politically. The constitution of liberty has rarely 
been more precious than in these days. That it is no guarantee of happiness 
we are told by our young every day. But to the present day, it seems to me 
the only guarantee against the institutionalization of unhappiness, i.e. to 
the creation of conditions which restrict people's choices and chances. In 
this sense, the European Community is a community of free countries which 
will clearly want to maintain the closest relations to those parts of the 
world which defend the free realization of man's life chances as well. 
One part of freedom -- and this is my second point -- is free trade. 
I do not want to be either romantic or fanatic about this question; but it 
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is important to realize that the connection between domestic and foreign 
policy is still particularly close in this field. The idea of self-suffi-
ciency is usually fhe other side of a coin on which the name of nationalist 
tyranny is inscribed. It is a terrible truth that even highly-developed 
countries sometimes care more about protecting segmental interests than about 
protecting liberty. But the 1930's are still in many memories, and they, too, 
began by some thinking that they should isolate themselves from the rest. I 
need not remind you of their end. It would be useful if our mutual insight 
led us to decide that whenever we are faced with a choice of alternatives, 
we shall opt for liberal rather than protectionist solutions. The escalation 
of restrictions is an escalation of anxieties, and it is unworthy of free 
countries. 
Thirdly, it is clearly a condition of reasonable relations between free 
countries that mutual injury must be avoided. This requires an outward-looking 
attitude on the part of all. Despite assertions to the contrary, I can state 
for the European Community that we have so far hurt none by our association 
and that we do not intend to do so in the future. If the United States can 
say the same, they would follow the principleson which they were founded. 
I am, of course, aware of the fact that this is the position taken by reason-
able people on either side of the Atlantic, and I recognize that Secretary of 
State Rogers made this point clearly in the Senate hearings about the Trade 
Bill this week. At the same time, I have to express our deep concern about 
what I would describe as an inward turn in American public and political ~ 
opinion, which is a cause of surprise and concern with all those who like to 
see America play a responsible role in world politics. 
Without wanting to overstate my case, there is a fourth point which I 
have to make. The road from dependence to partnership is always difficult. 
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This is all the more true if we consider the complex mixture of interdependence 
and independent partnership as it now exists between Europe and the United States. 
We, who have befome the largest trading power in the world, and are under 
way to increasing our assembled political strength, intend to use our position 
in a mature and moderate manner. In doing so, we hope that you will accept 
those facts which are the concomitant of partnership, including the facts of 
life of the European Cormnunity, as it stands today. Our agricultural policy, 
for example, is not directed against anyone, but is is one of the facts ~o 
be accepted if real partnership is to develop. 
/ 
I do not want to be misunderstood here. The European Community, as I 
have tried to point out, is a process. We are prepared to change our policies 
wherever we regard this as necessary. This means that we are open also to 
arguments from outside. But this again must be a mutual preparedness. My 
fifth point is, therefore, that whatever happens, Europe and the United States 
should continue to talk, and to talk frankly. The demand sounds modest, but 
it is meant very seriously indeed. Both the United States and the European 
Community are obviously free to take their decisions in accordance with their 
goals and interests. But it would seem to be in the interest of both the 
exchange of views before, during, after 
our decisions. 
and perhaps not least -- about 
There are solemn but necessary words about a relation which has started 
well, but is presently a source of concern in many places. To underline what 
I mean and to summarize these remarks about the emerging role of the European 
Community, let me conclude by emphasizing one central point. 
The European Community is a developing reality. As it grows in member-
ship, and in substance, it will become less rather than more preoccupied with 
. 
I I 
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its internal relations. The common external tariff is not the whole truth 
of Europe. Indeed, if the European Community was no more than a free trade 
I 
zone, we might as well disband it tomorrow. There may be many uncertainties 
about the CoIT1Y1unity, and even today I would hesitate to predict with certain-
ty its full success. But it is clear already that rather than close itself 
to the outside world, the Community is going to promote free trade. Our 
interest in generalized preferences is indicative of our attitude. But at 
the risk of being repetitive, let me return once again to the politital 
potential of the Community and to The Hague, and quote from Point 4 of the 
Communiqu~ agreed upon in December, 1969: "The chiefs of state and heads of 
government confirm expressly their finalities which give its meaning and its 
relevance to the Community. They indicate their decisiveness in pursuing 
this enterprise and emphasize their confidence in the eventual success of 
their efforts. If an unusual source of development, of progress and of cul-
ture is not to dry up, if the equilibrium of the world is tobe maintained 
and peace to be preserved, it is their common conviction that a Europe is 
unescapable which unites states whose essential interests coincide while 
respecting national peculiarities, a Europe which is certain of its own 
cohesion, which maintains its friendship towards other states, and which is 
aware of its task to further international d~tente, and the understanding 
of peoples, especially between the peoplesof the entire European continent." 
It is difficult to describe the role of the European Community in world 
politics today more clearly. 
* * * * * 
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
COMMON MARKET TRADE SPOKESMAN ARRIVES FOR TALKS 
WASHINGTON, D.C., October 14 -- Ralf Dahrendorf, Member of the 
Commission of the European Communities, arrives in Washington today 
for a round of talks October 15 and 16 with Administration officials 
on trade issues affecting the United States and the Common Market. 
Mr. Dahrendorf, accompanied by Community trade specialists, will 
confer with officials of the Department of State, Treasury, Agriculture 
and Commerce and with representatives of the Office of the Special Trade 
Representative and the Council of Economic Advisers. 
The agenda of the two-day talks at the State Department is expected 
to cover issues such as the proposed U.S. trade legislation, problems of 
world agricultural trade, non-tariff barriers and special and generalized 
trade preferences. The spokesman for the U.S. will be Deputy Under Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs Nathaniel Samuels. 
The visit is one in a series of top-level exchanges between the Common 
Market's Commission and the U.S. Administration on major trade interests of 
the two trading partners who together account for some 38 per cent of world 
trade. 
Mr. Dahrendorf was appointed to the nine-member Commission last July 
. . . .. 
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and has particular responsibility for external affairs and trade. 
He is accompanied by Theodorus Hijzen, Acting Director General for 
Trade Policy; Louis Rabot, Director General for Agricultural Affairs; 
Fernand Braun, Deputy Director General for Industrial Affairs; Paul Luyten, 
Acting Director for Commercial Policy, and Otto von Schwerin, a member 
of Mr. Dahrendorf's cabinet. 
Mr. Dahrendorf arrives in Washington tonight at 8:55 p.m. at National 
Airport. Earlier today he addressed an international affairs conference 
at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
If If If If 
NOTE: Arrangements for a press conference or backgrounder will be confirmed 
after the arrival of the Common Market team. 
